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INSPECTIONS TO AVERT TERRORISM: ROBUSTNESS UNDER SEVERE 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
Abstract: Protecting against terrorist attacks requires making decisions in a world in which 
attack probabilities are largely unknown. The potential for very large losses encourages a 
conservative perspective, in particular toward decisions that are robust. But robustness, in the 
sense of assurance against extreme outcomes, ordinarily is not the only desideratum in uncertain 
environments. We adopt Yakov Ben-Haim’s (2001b) model of information gap decision making 
to investigate the problem of inspecting a number of similar targets when one of the targets may 
be attacked, but with unknown probability. We apply this to a problem of inspecting a sample of 
incoming shipping containers for a terrorist weapon. While it is always possible to lower the risk 
of a successful attack by inspecting more vessels, we show that robustness against the failure to 
guarantee a minimum level of expected utility might not be monotonic. Robustness modeling 
based on expected utility and incorporating inspection costs yields decision protocols that are a 
useful alternative to traditional risk analysis.  
 
Keywords: Terrorism, Robustness, Severe Uncertainty, Port Security 
 
1. Introduction 
Terrorism involves unorthodox attacks, primarily on civilians, with the aim of producing 
damage, and especially fear, within the targeted population.  There are several ways of reducing 
its potential impacts:  neutralizing the terrorists before they act; intercepting terrorist actions after 
they commence but before they are actually consummated; and hardening potential targets.  This 
paper is about the second of these options, in particular that of intercepting a surreptitious terror-
ist attack that may be launched against one of some number of similar targets.  Examples 
abound.  One is the much-commented upon problem of incoming shipping containers.  Millions 
arrive each year into the various ports of the country.  A substantial undetected weapon in one of 
them could cause great damage.  Another example is reservoirs; there are many thousands scat-
tered around the country, any one of which could be attacked with a biological or chemical 
agent.  Still another example is aircraft; with thousands of passenger and cargo flights every day, 
history has shown us that an attack on just one can produce enormous damage if it succeeds.  
Agricultural bioterrorism is still another example.  For any type of output – wheat, corn, a certain 
type of livestock, etc., there are hundreds or perhaps thousands of individual farms against which 
an attack could be launched with the intent of introducing a pathogen that would spread to other 
farms or a contaminant that would create fear among consumers. 
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Modeling this as a case of risk management implies knowing, or assuming, something 
about attack probabilities and the effectiveness of steps that might be taken to reduce the ultimate 
probabilities of damage.  There has been work to develop and examine time series of terrorist 
events over reasonably long periods (Enders and Sandler (2002); Mickolus et al. (1989, 1993); 
Enders et al. (1992); O’Brien (1996)).  But it is not straightforward to turn frequencies into attack 
probabilities for specific targets. Use of expert judgment for the purposes of risk assessment can 
also be problematic both from methodological and experiential perspectives. There is no 
formally established methodology for treating expert judgment, and Bayesian and other 
approaches suffer from limitations in practical application (Ouchi (2004)). Risk assessment in 
practice has proved to be difficult, time consuming, and expensive in some important 
applications and virtually impossible in others. What this strongly suggests is that it may not be 
useful to analyze the defense against terrorism as if they were decisions involving gambles with 
known probabilities.  In this paper, therefore, we present an analysis of decisions to intercept 
terrorist actions that can be taken without knowing, or assuming, anything about the probability 
distributions associated with terrorist actions, that is, under conditions of true uncertainty. 
Of course some tools have been developed for addressing situations of true uncertainty; 
this includes the maximin, maximax, Laplace, and Hurwitc criteria (see e.g., Render et al. 
(2003)).  While none of these criteria require knowledge of probability distributions for applica-
tion, the first two represent polar extremes in terms of optimism and pessimism while the latter 
two require information similar to probabilities in order to be applied.  Similarly, quantification 
of other notions related to uncertainty such as ignorance and surprise have also required specifi-
cation of functions confined to the unit interval (Katzner (1998); Horan et al. (2002)).  Addi-
tionally, Kelsey (1993) developed a distinctive decision theory requiring a ranking of event 
probabilities rather than a specific probability distribution.  Perhaps for these reasons, none of 
these decision criteria under uncertainty have achieved the widespread application in economics 
afforded traditional risk criteria. 
In the case of terrorism, the possibility that losses could be large encourages a 
conservative outlook, as is inherent in the maximin criterion. Maximin is maximally robust in the 
sense that it guarantees a result that equals or exceeds the worst of the possible outcomes that 
might result from a chosen strategy. But robustness is not everything; in return for better 
performance on some other important parameter one may be willing to give up some degree of 
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robustness. This implies a decision model which, though featuring robustness, accommodates 
tradeoffs with other parameters when the situation warrants.  
Recently Ben-Haim (1999) has developed a theory of decision-making under true 
uncertainty that he calls information (info)-gap decision theory (Ben-Haim (1994); Ben-Haim 
(1999); Ben-Haim (2001a)).  Info-gap decision theory is designed for decisions in which 
probability distributions for uncontrolled events are not available.  The essence of info-gap is 
pursuit of a performance requirement over the largest possible “range” of uncontrolled events.  
There have been a number of applications of the info-gap theory to problems ranging from 
selection of financial portfolios to optimal search in predator-prey systems (Ben-Haim (2001b)). 
In the next section we generalize info-gap theory with expected utility as a measure of 
performance.  In section 3 we use this approach to model a problem of protecting against 
terrorism: inspecting a large number of container ships for the presence of materials which, if not 
detected, would produce great damage in a target population. Uncertainty in this problem is 
about the probability that harmful material has been placed on one of the ships. We do not 
specify a utility function for the decision maker; rather we simply assume that the decision 
maker is risk averse, perhaps weakly. Our primary motivation with this model is to characterize 
the trade-off between costly inspections and robustness. Robustness in our problem is the 
maximum range of the unknown probability of a terrorist attack for which a performance 
criterion is satisfied. Thus, it is a notion of security against failing to meet a performance 
criterion. Security in our formulation has two dimensions: security against failing to avert a 
successful terrorist attack with some low probability, and security against failing to meet a 
minimum level of expected utility. As one would intuit, we show that security against failing to 
avert a terrorist attack is increasing in the number of inspected vessels. However, when the 
problem of robustness is posed in the economic terms of guaranteeing a minimum level of 
expected utility for a decision maker with an unknown degree of risk aversion, there could be a 
potentially large range of numbers of inspections for which more inspections leave the decision 
maker less secure. In some situations, therefore, a decision maker may face a difficult trade-off: 
increasing inspections to increase the level of security against a successful terrorist attack may 
reduce security against failing to meet a minimum level of expected utility.   
In section 4 we conduct a series of simulations to investigate the effects of problem 
parameters on robustness against failing to meet a minimum level of expected utility. We find 
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that for a given number of inspections, robustness is decreasing in the size of the loss from a 
successful terrorist attack, a critical failure probability, and the elasticity of the inspection costs. 
We also investigate the effects of these parameters on the monotonicity of robustness. We 
conclude in section 5.   
 
2. Uncertainty and Robustness 
Ben-Haim’s (1999) info-gap decision theory is built on the specification of four components: the 
system model, the performance requirement, the uncertainty model, and the robustness function. 
In his decision framework, the system model expresses the structure of rewards that follows from 
decisions and events. For example, it might be the structure of net benefits accruing to a decision 
maker on the basis of their choices of alternative levels of inputs, together with uncertain events 
in the environment. The performance requirement is some particular reward level deemed 
necessary in a given decision problem. Some minimum level of net benefits might be chosen as a 
performance requirement, for example. The uncertainty model consists of a family of convex, 
nested sets where the elements of each set are possible realizations of uncertain events affecting 
rewards. In this uncertainty framework, the higher the degree of nesting, the greater the 
uncertainty about events. The robustness function shows the relationship between decision 
variables and the greatest level of uncertainty at which the performance requirement will be 
achieved; it is the subject of maximization to identify the optimal robust decision. In addition, 
Ben-Haim distinguishes between the info-gap models where probability is not regarded as an 
appropriate uncertainty concept (e.g., cases involving novel events) versus “hybrid” cases where 
probability is an applicable concept but is unknown and difficult to assess.  
 While preserving the info-gap philosophy of uncertainty and robustness, we generalize 
the theory’s components to include both the basic info-gap and hybrid cases and to permit a less 
restrictive characterization of uncertainty. Let v V∈ denote possible realizations of uncertain 
elements in a decision problems where V is any set, and let x X∈ be a vector of decision 
variables in the problem with .nx R∈  The set V can encompass uncertain elements including 
parameters, exogenous variables, probability distributions, etc. The system model reflects the 
structure of rewards depending on both x and v, while the performance requirement is a 
predetermined reward level. Uncertainty about possible realizations of elements affecting 
rewards is U = P(V), where ( )⋅P  denotes the power set (all possible subsets) of V.  Note that the 
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elements of U consist of possible realizations of uncertain problem elements; however, they need 
not be convex. Given an ordering relation on U, the robustness function, ( ),xα  is a set-valued 
function : ( )X Vα → P  describing the largest element of U that satisfies the performance 
requirement conditional on decision x. An ordering relation is needed to compare elements of U 
that satisfy the performance requirement, and reflects the meaning of robustness in the decision 
problem. The robustness function indicates the most robust element of U, conditional on x that 
satisfies the performance requirement. The optimal robust decision is arg max ( );x X xα∈  that is, 
the value of the decision variable that leads to a maximum of the robustness function.  
The following decision problem will help to make the components of our decision 
framework more complete. Let the reward be a random variable v, and U(v) be the decision 
maker’s von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function. The reward is determined by the level of a 
decision variable, x, and an unknown conditional probability density function, f(v | x), that 
represents the uncertainty inherent in the decision maker’s environment. Let g(v) be a probability 
density function for v used in specifying a performance requirement.  The system model defines 
rewards and is taken to be expected utility, ( )U i , where the expectation is evaluated with respect 
to the subscripted probability density function.  The uncertainty model, U, consists of the power 
set of conditional probability density functions, { ( | )}f v x .  The robustness function, ( )xα , 
indicates the largest subset of U (the ordering relation is assumed to be the number of elements) 
over which the performance requirement (smallest acceptable expected reward) gU  will be 
achieved.   
The robust optimal decision can be found by solving  
(1)      ( )
x X
Maximize xα
∈
 
(2) Subject to  f gU U≥  
(3)   ( | )  = 1f v x dv∫  
(4)  ( | ) 0f v x ≥  
(5)   x X∈ , 
 
where the set X reflects any constraints on x other than the performance requirement and those 
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constraints on the conditional density, ( | )f v x , related to the definition of a probability density 
function.  Assuming a solution exists, the solution to (1) - (5) provides a specific value of the 
decision variable, x∗ , associated conditional density function, ( | )f v x∗ , and maximum 
robustness, ( ).xα α∗ ∗=  Given an appropriate specification of robustness, the performance 
requirement will be achieved not only under ( | )f v x∗ , but also under perhaps a wide range of 
related densities. 
As it stands, the model (1) - (5) poses a difficult constrained optimization problem.  The 
two key elements that are needed to implement (1) - (5) are specifications of the robustness 
objective function and the performance requirement, which is shown in (2) as a constraint on 
expected utility.  As demonstrated in the next section, it is possible to make meaningful 
specifications for both of these elements in the context of robust inspections of ships for a 
terrorist weapon.   
 
3. Robustness and Inspections at Containerports 
In this section we illustrate the use of the model developed in the previous section for allocating 
scarce resources to manage a security risk under uncertainty.  Risks are managed through 
detection effort consisting of inspections for a terrorist weapon of trade shipments to an 
international containerport.  Port security is a complex problem involving a variety of functions; 
random inspections of container cargo may be one part of an efficient policy (see e.g., Harrald et 
al. (2003)).  Hence, use here of the model developed in the previous section is intended to focus 
on a robust detection effort. In particular we are interested in characterizing the trade-off 
between costly inspections and robustness; that is, how the largest range of uncertainty under 
which a performance criterion is satisfied varies with the number of inspected vessels. 
Suppose that B denote the benefit due to shipping activity at a containerport without a 
security threat; p denotes the probability that a weapon is present on one of N vessels that will 
call at the port, and L denotes the cost of failure to prevent passage of this weapon through the 
port.  The port manager’s decision is to choose the number of random inspections of incoming 
vessels to prevent passage of the weapon through the port. A traditional approach would evaluate 
the opportunity costs of inspection compared to the expected benefits of this action, where these 
expected benefits would depend critically on the probability of a terrorist attack.  We will 
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proceed, however, with an assumption that we do not know what this probability is, but the port 
manager must choose the number of vessels to inspect in spite of this uncertainty. Let n denote 
the number of vessels inspected for these materials at cost C(n), with ( ) 0C n′ >  and 0C′′ ≥ . The 
probability that there is a weapon on one of the vessels, p, is completely unknown; hence, we 
adopt model (1)—(5) to investigate the trade-off between inspections and robustness. 
Given inspections, n, and a probability that a weapon is aboard one of the vessels, p, the 
conditional probability density function, f(v | n, p), for net benefit, v, is 
 
(6) 
( )
( )
1  if  =  - ( )
( | , )  
if  =  -  - ( ).
p N n
v B C n
Nf v n p
p N n
v B L C n
N
− −=  −
 
 
The uncertainty model is the set { }( | , ),  [0, ],  [0,1] ,f v n p n N p∈ ∈  and all its subsets. Given N, 
the uncertainty model consists of a set of probability density functions characterized by the 
inspection decision, n, and the unknown parameter, p, confined to the unit interval. Since 
uncertainty in this context is about the real value of p, the robustness function can be specified 
meaningfully as that value. Note that ( ) /p N n N− is the probability that a weapon passes 
through the port undetected. We will call this the failure probability and denote it by .π  Given n 
and p, the decision makers’ expected utility is  
 
(7) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) 1 ( ) / ( ) ( ) /fU U B C n p N n N U B L C n p N n N= − − − + − − − . 
 
The performance criterion for this problem is that f gU U≥ .  Two modeling decisions 
must be made at this point to specify the performance criterion. First, we need to specify the 
smallest acceptable expected utility, .gU  In addition we need to specify the decision maker’s 
utility function. This is a bit troubling, because in most cases the decision maker’s utility 
function will be unknown, either to him or her or to the analyst. Our approach is to assume that 
the decision maker’s utility function is unknown, but that it is known that he or she is risk averse 
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(perhaps weakly). Then we can appeal to well known results from the theory of stochastic 
dominance to specify the performance criterion. 
First let us model the smallest acceptable expected utility, .gU  In principle gU  can be 
any level deemed appropriate by the decision maker. We, however, derive gU  from another 
robustness/inspections tradeoff, but one that lacks economic content. Gauging the performance 
of stochastic systems by the probability of failure and establishing a performance requirement in 
terms of failure probability are common. Imagine a robust decision to hold the failure probability 
to be no more than some critical value, cπ , given that the probability that damaging material is 
on board one of the vessels is no more than pc. In effect, the decision maker is saying, given that 
I believe that the probability that a weapon is on one of the vessels is no more than pc, I will 
choose the number of inspections to make sure that my failure probability does not exceed cπ . 
We assume throughout that .c cp π>  Then, the performance requirement for robust inspections in 
terms of the unknown probability of a weapon passing through the port undetected is 
( ) / ,cp N n Nπ π= − ≤  for [0, ].cp p∈   
As noted above the robustness function can be specified simply with respect to p. For this 
problem the robustness function is  
 
(8) { }[0, ]( , , ) max | max  ( ) / ,  [0, ] .cc c cp pp n p p p N n N n Nπ π∈= − ≤ ∈  
 
Maximal robustness given inspections and the performance criterion requires choosing p so that 
the performance criterion is exactly satisfied. Therefore, the solution to (8) is  
 
(9) ( , , ) /( ),  [0, ],  [0, ].c c c cp n p N N n p p n Nπ π= − ∈ ∈  
 
The robustness function indicates security against failing to hold the probability of a 
successful terrorist attack to no more than the critical failure probability. Given inspections, n, if 
the actual probability of a terrorist attack is less than ( , , )c cp n pπ , then the probability of a 
successful attack is less than the critical failure probability, cπ ; but if the actual probability of an 
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attack is greater than ( , , )c cp n pπ  the probability of a successful attack will exceed cπ . Thus, 
higher values of robustness indicate greater security against failing to hold the probability of 
terrorist’s success to no more than the critical failure probability.  
 Note that ( , , )c cp n pπ is monotonically increasing in inspections. That is, security against 
failing to hold the probability of a successful attack to no more than the critical failure 
probability is increasing in the number of inspected vessels. This is a rather intuitive 
conclusion—more inspections increase the range of attack probabilities for which the required 
failure probability is not exceeded.  Choosing inspections to maximize robustness in this context 
is to simply choose ( )c c c cn N p pπ= −  so that ( , , ) .c c cp n p pπ =  That is, the strategy of 
inspecting cn vessels guarantees that the critical failure probability is not exceeded for any 
chance that an attack has occurred up to the constraint on this chance.1  
Now define the probability density function for payoffs, v, with inspections, 
( )c c c cn N p pπ= − , evaluated at maximum constrained robustness, pc: 
 
(10) 
1  if ( )
( | , )
 if  = ( ).
c c
c c
c c
v B C n
g v n p
v B L C n
π
π
− = −=  − −
 
 
Expected utility of ( | , )c cg v n p  is  
 
 (11) ( )( ) ( )( ) 1 ( )g c c c cU U B C n U B L C nπ π= − − + − − .2 
 
Now let us turn to guaranteeing that f gU U≥  when U is unknown. Assuming that the 
                                                 
1 Note that cn  is decreasing in cπ  and increasing in pc. Thus, inspections to meet the performance criterion are 
decreasing in the maximum allowable failure probability, and increasing in the upper bound the decision maker 
places on the probability that harmful material is on one of the ships. 
2 It is easy to demonstrate that gU  is monotonically decreasing in pc. This is intuitive. If the decision maker 
considers a larger range of probabilities that harmful material is on board one of the vessels, then more inspections 
are needed to make sure that the failure probability does not exceed cπ . Thus, a higher pc implies higher inspection 
costs and lower expected utility of ( | , )c cg v n p . It is not possible to determine how gU  changes with the critical 
failure probability cπ  without additional structure on the decision makers’ utility function.  
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decision maker is risk averse, then f gU U≥  can be replaced with a condition based on second-
degree stochastic dominance (SSD). Let the cumulative distribution functions of ( | , )f v n p  and 
( | , )c cg v n p  be ( | , )F v n p  and ( | , )c cG v n p , respectively. Then, ( | , )f v n p  dominates 
( | , )c cg v n p  in the sense of SSD if and only if   
 
(12) ( )( | , ) ( | , ) 0,v c cG t n p F t n p dt−∞ − ≥∫  for all v. 
 
Furthermore, if ( | , )f v n p  dominates ( | , )c cg v n p , then ( | , )f v n p is at least as preferred to 
( | , )c cg v n p  by any risk averse decision maker (Hadar and Russell 1969, 1971). Thus, when a 
risk-averse decision maker’s utility function is unknown, the performance requirement, f gU U≥ , 
can be replaced with (12).   
 The cumulative distribution functions in this problem are step functions corresponding to 
the discrete probability density functions specified in (6) and (10).  An example is provided in 
Figure 1.  Note that (12) holds if and only if cn n≤ and B A≤ . The latter inequality is  
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( ))c c c cp N n B C n B L C n B L C n B L C nN π π
− − − − − − ≤ − − − − −   , 
 
which simplifies to ( )( )( ) / ( ) ( ) 0.c cp N n N L C n C n Lπ− + − − ≤  
 We are now ready to specify the robustness function for the port manager. It is 
 
(13) ( , , , , )c cp n L C pπ =  
( )( ){ }[0, ]max | max  ( ) / ( ) ( ) 0,  [0, ( ) / ] .c c c c c cp pp p N n N L C n C n L n N p pπ π∈ − + − − ≤ ∈ −  
 
In this problem the robustness function depends not only on the number of inspections, n, but 
also the potential loss from a weapon passing through the port undetected, L, the inspection cost 
function, C, the critical failure probability used to specify the performance criterion, and the 
upper bound the decision maker places on the probability that a weapon is present on one of the 
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vessels, pc. Given these conditions of the problem, the robustness function specifies maximal 
values of p for each value of n for which any risk averse decision maker prefers the probability 
density function ( | , )f v n p  to ( | , )c cg v n p . Thus maximizing robustness given n is constrained 
by the SSD conditions [0, ( ) / ]c c c cn n N p pπ∈ = −  and 
( )( )( ) / ( ) ( ) 0.c cp N n N L C n C n Lπ− + − − ≤  Since maximizing p, given n, requires that this latter 
constraint hold with equality when [0, ],cp p∈  the robustness function is  
 
(14) ( , , , , )c cp n L C pπ =  
( ) ( )( ) [0, ],  [0, ( ) / ].( ) ( ) /c c c c cc c c
N L p n N p p
N n L C n C N p p
π ππ ∈ ∈ −− + − −
3 
  
Specifying the decision maker’s performance criterion in terms of a minimum level of expected 
utility changes the notion of security against failure. Given inspections, n, the robustness 
function indicates the largest range of the unknown probability of a terrorist attack for which the 
expected utility of any risk averse decision maker does not fall below the expected utility of 
guaranteeing that the probability of a successful attack does not exceed some critical failure 
probability.  Thus, greater levels of ( , , , , )c cp n L C pπ indicate that the decision maker is more 
secure against failing to guarantee the minimum level of expected utility.  
 Not surprisingly, a solution to choosing n to maximize ( , , , )cp n L C π  is to inspect 
( ) /c c c cn N p pπ= − vessels to induce robustness p = pc.  Of course, this is the robust optimal 
strategy for making sure that the critical failure probability, ,cπ  is not exceeded. Consequently 
this is not a very informative strategy for a decision maker because it has no economic content. 
Moreover, this strategy may be unreasonably costly.  A decision maker will want a full 
accounting of the fundamental trade-off between robustness against a terrorist attack and the 
costly activity of inspecting cargo vessels. In the next section we pursue this issue by examining 
the characteristics of ( , , , , )c cp n L C pπ . 
 
                                                 
3 Note that any fixed costs of inspections will cancel out in ( , , , )cp n L C π . Thus, robustness in this context does not 
depend on fixed inspection costs, only variable costs.  
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4. Robustness Against a Terrorist Attack 
In this section we examine the characteristics of the robustness function, particularly how it 
varies with inspections and alternative parameter values.  It is useful at this point to put this into 
context. Our ultimate search is for a way to offer guidance to a port manager who must make 
decisions with very little information to go on. In particular we assume he, or she, does not know 
the attack probabilities they face, and in fact knows little about their own utility function, other 
than that they are risk averse.  
Given inspections, n, ( , , , , )c cp n L C pπ  is the maximum probability of an attack for which 
the port manager is guaranteed a minimum expected utility.  Figure 2 shows the robustness 
function under the following assumptions: B = 925 10× ; L = 91 10× ; C(n) = 1000n2; N = 1000; 
cπ  = 0.05, and cp  = 1.0. We do not include fixed inspection costs, because we’ve already noted 
that robustness does not depend on these costs. Moreover, our assumption that pc = 1.0 means 
that the decision maker does not place an upper bound the range of attack probabilities that he or 
she is considering. The most obvious feature of the relationship between robustness and 
inspections in Figure 2 is that it is not monotonic; it has a local maximum at n , and a global 
maximum at ( ) / (1 ).c c c c cn N p p Nπ π= − = −  
 At first blush, one might expect that robustness would increase as the number of 
inspected vessels increases, but this is clearly not always the case. We have been using 
robustness to indicate the decision maker’s security against failure. Recall that security in our 
formulation has two dimensions: security against failing to guarantee that the probability of a 
successful attack does not exceed some low probability, and security against failing to meet a 
minimum level of expected utility. The former is clearly increasing in the number of inspected 
vessels because, for some attack probability, more inspections imply a lower probability of a 
successful attack.  On the other hand, Figure 2 makes it clear that security against failing to 
guarantee a minimum level of expected utility may not be monotonic in inspections. Thus, when 
the problem of robustness is posed in the economic terms of benefits and costs under unspecified 
risk aversion, there could be a potentially large range of numbers of inspections for which more 
inspections leave the decision maker less secure. In some situations, therefore, a decision maker 
may face a difficult trade-off: increasing inspections to increase the level of security against a 
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successful terrorist attack may reduce security against failing to meet a minimum level of 
expected utility.   
Let us investigate the non-monotonicity of ( , , , , )c cp n L C pπ  more thoroughly. Ignoring 
the boundary constraints on the robustness function for the moment, from (14) obtain 
 
( ){ }
( )( ) 2
( ) / ( ) ( )( )( , , , , ) .
( ) ( ) / ( )
c c c cc c
c c c
NL L C N p p C n C n N np n L C p
n N n L C N p p C n
π ππ
π
′− − + − −∂ =∂  − − − + 
 
 
Clearly, robustness is increasing in n if and only if  
 
(15) ( )( ) / ( )( ) ( ).c c cL C N p p C n N n C nπ ′− − > − −  
 
On the left hand side of (15), ( )( ) /c c cL C N p pπ− −  is a constant: the cost term is the 
total cost of inspecting enough vessels to guarantee that the failure probability does not exceed 
cπ , for any [0, ]cp p∈ . For our numerical example, ( )( ) / $97.5 million.c c cL C N p pπ− − =  On 
the right hand side of (15) we have ( )( ) ( ).C n N n C n′ − −  For our example: ( )( ) ( )C n N n C n′ − −  
is equal to zero when n is zero; it is strictly concave, reaching a maximum of $333.33 million at 
about 333 inspected vessels, and is negative for about 667 inspected vessels and greater. Clearly, 
the robustness function is not monotonic if and only if the maximum of ( )( ) ( )C n N n C n′ − −  
exceeds ( )( ) /c c cL C N p pπ− −  as it does in our example. Note further that for low n 
( )( ) / ( )( ) ( ),c c cL C N p p C n N n C nπ ′− − > − −  so robustness is increasing. At some level ( n  in 
Figure 2), ( )( ) ( )C n N n C n′ − −  rises above ( )( ) /c c cL C N p pπ− − , driving robustness down. 
The final increase in robustness comes about because ( )( ) ( )C n N n C n′ − −  falls below 
( )( ) /c c cL C N p pπ− −  and rather quickly becomes negative, driving robustness ultimately up to 
pc = 1.    
 It is clear that the term ( )( ) /c c cL C N p pπ− −  has an important impact on the robustness 
function. Therefore, the robustness function is determined, in part, by the levels of the potential 
loss from an attack, L; the range of attack probabilities that the decision maker is willing to 
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allow, [0, pc], and the critical failure probability used to determine the decision maker’s 
performance criterion, .cπ  Let us examine the effects of the first two parameters on the 
robustness function.  
It is easy to demonstrate that the robustness function of (14) is montonically decreasing in 
the potential damage. Figure 3 depicts three robustness functions for three different levels of loss 
L: L(med) = $1 billion; L(large) = $1.3 billion; and L(small) = $0.98 billion.  Clearly, for any 
number of inspections, robustness is lower the larger is the damage from a successful attack. 
Thus, the range of probabilities over which the port manager meets or exceeds his or her chosen 
level of minimum expected utility is smaller the larger the damage from a successful attack.   
 Note also that the monotonicity of the robustness function is associated with the size of 
potential damage—relatively large levels of potential loss imply that the robustness function is 
monotonically increasing. This effect can be deduced directly from (15). Recall that the 
robustness function is monotonically increasing if and only if ( )( ) /c c cL C N p pπ− −  is greater 
than the maximum of ( )( ) ( )C n N n C n′ − − . With L(large) = $1.3 billion, ( )( ) /c c cL C N p pπ− −   
$397.5 million= while [ ]max ( )( ) ( ) $333.33 million.C n N n C n′ − − =   
Achievable levels of robustness are also related to the minimum level of performance that 
is required. In general, the higher this minimum performance the lower the attainable level of 
robustness. We have set the performance requirement in terms of a level of expected utility, in 
particular that level of utility achieved with a robustness of unity under a critical failure rate of 
0.05. One could argue that setting p = 1.0 is unnecessarily conservative, that the authorities may 
be confident in thinking that the true attack probability is, say, no greater than 0.5, or perhaps 
even lower. Thus, although they do not know the probability, they can, with some confidence, 
give it a realistic upper bound.  
 This argues for changing the minimum expected utility, specifying it as the expected 
utility of guaranteeing the failure rate of no more than 0.05, but a maximum value of the real 
attack probability, pc, held to be realistic by the authorities. Reducing pc reduces the number of 
vessels that must be inspected to hold the probability of a successful attack to no more than a 
given value. That is ( ) /c c cN p pπ−  declines as pc is reduced, which raises the minimum level of 
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expected utility the decision maker specifies in his or her performance criterion.4  Consequently, 
for any level of inspections, robustness is lower for a lower maximum value of possible attack 
probabilities that the decision maker deems reasonable.  Figure 4 confirms that the robustness 
function is monotonically decreasing in pc.  
Note also that the monotonicity of ( , , , , )c cp n L C pπ  is related to the maximum value of 
the attack probability—very low maximum levels of this probability tend to make robustness 
monotonic in inspections. With pc = 0.2, only 750 vessels need to be inspected to guarantee that 
the failure probability does not exceed 0.05 for possible attack probabilities between 0 and 0.2. 
The cost of inspecting this many vessels is ( )( ) / $562.5 millionc c cC N p pπ− =  and 
( )( ) / $437.5 million.c c cL C N p pπ− − =  Since this is larger than [ ]max ( )( ) ( )C n N n C n′ − − = 
$333.33 million, the robustness function is monotonically increasing in inspections. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have sought to find a new way of modeling decisions in situations where the 
probabilities of certain key precipitating events are unknown. We have modified the info-gap 
model of Ben-Haim (2001b) to model inspection decisions for incoming terrorist weapons  when 
the probability that a weapon is actually on an incoming vessel is unknown. The model proceeds 
by using the concept of robustness, defined as a level of assurance that an outcome will be no 
worse for the decision maker than some chosen critical value of performance. In our case the 
critical value is defined in terms of expected utility of guaranteeing that the probability of failing 
to avert a successful terrorist attack does not exceed some low probability. The decision maker 
chooses the number of incoming vessels to inspect in the light of the implications of this for the 
level of robustness that is attainable relative to this critical value. We show that this approach 
does offer a way of characterizing trade-offs despite the ignorance of attack probabilities. 
Perhaps our most interesting finding is that, while security against failing to hold the probability 
of a successful terrorist attack to no more than some critical failure probability is increasing in 
the number of inspected vessels, security against the failure of a decision maker with an 
unknown degree of risk aversion to guarantee a minimum level of expected utility may not be 
monotonic. We also show that the achievable levels of robustness are affected by many factors, 
                                                 
4 It is evident that the minimum level of expected utility could be increased in two ways: by lowering the critical 
failure rate, or by maintaining the critical failure rate but reducing pc. We have chosen the latter. 
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including inspection costs, the size of the prospective losses if an attack succeeds, and the level 
of expected utility taken as the critical performance level. 
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Figure 1: Depiction of the Stochastic Dominance Performance Requirement 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Robustness and Inspections 
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Figure 3: Robustness and the Loss from a Successful Attack.  
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Figure 4: Robustness and the Maximum Probability of an Attack. 
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